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Abstract:  Why do some countries spend more on and make more use of distributive measures than  
others? Which institutions systematically shape spending on and frequency of use of these measures?  
Cross-country  longitudinal  tests  of  theories  that  emphasize  the  institutional  determinants  of  
distributive policies are rare. We test a battery of competing hypotheses on spending and frequency  
using data on state aid expenditure by EU member states between 1992 and 2009 and on applications  
logged by such states between 1999 and 2009. We find that higher district magnitude lowers spending  
on and use of distributive measures if party leaders control access to the ballot rank. More measures  
are adopted if an increase in magnitude is associated with lack of ballot control. In case of single party  
majority or cohesive coalition governments, greater reliance on delegation rather than contract fiscal  
institutions lowers spending.
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Why do some countries spend more on and make more use of distributive measures than others? Which 
institutions systematically shape spending on and frequency of use of these measures? According to 
several scholars, electoral and fiscal institutions should systematically affect the propensity of a country 
to rely and spend on this type of policies (e.g. Carey and Shugart 1995; Hallerberg, Strauch, and von 
Hagen  2009;  Persson  and  Tabellini  1999;  2000),  but  cross-country  longitudinal  studies  are  rare. 
Additionally,  to our knowledge, no work exists that tries to explain their  frequency of use. This is 
unfortunate because, besides social welfare or economic efficiency, partisan-political factors do matter, 
as several country studies show (see the review in Golden and Picci 2008: 268). These works however 
can hardly subject to test theories that emphasize institutional determinants, simply because a country’s 
institutions tend to remain invariant or change very slowly over time.
A primary cause of this  paucity of research resides on the difficulty  in  finding comparable  cross-
country  data  on  measures  such  as  public  infrastructural  investments  or  intergovernmental  grants. 
According to Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen (1981: 644), a distributive policy is 'a political decision 
that  concentrates  benefits  in  a  specific  geographic  constituency and finances  expenditures  through 
generalized  taxation  ...  what  distinguishes  a  distributive  policy  is  that  benefits  are  geographically 
targeted'. In this article, we argue that the policy on state aid control of the European Union (EU) offer 
comparable country-level data, across several countries and several years, that fit this definition. We 
test a battery of competing hypotheses on spending on and frequency of use of distributive measures  
employing  data  on  state  aid  expenditure  by  EU  member  states  between  1992  and  2009  and  on 
applications to grant aid logged by such states between 1999 and 2009. We show that the interaction 
between two electoral  institutions,  district  magnitude and ballot  control,  affects  both spending and 
frequency of use. We also show that, under given circumstances, greater reliance on delegation rather 
than contract fiscal institutions lowers spending.
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In the next section, we employ the political-economy literature on the determinants of fiscal policy,  
especially of distributive fiscal measures, to develop a series of hypotheses on spending and frequency. 
Next, we present the data we have collected and the operationalization of the variables. The last section 
discusses the results and draws some conclusions.
The Politics of Distribution in Parliamentary Systems
We  employ  four  sets  of  theories  that  put  emphasis  on,  respectively,  electoral  rewards,  types  of 
government,  fiscal  institutions,  and  government  ideology.  Empirical  tests  of  these  theories 
predominately focus on broad fiscal aggregates rather than on the narrower spending on distributive 
measures.
Elections and electoral institutions
First  and  foremost,  politicians  want  to  be  reelected.  This  was  the  fundamental  intuition  behind 
Nordhaus’  (1975)  political  business  cycle  model.  A  government  manipulates  the  level  of 
unemployment,  through  economic  policies  such  as  public  investments,  in  order  to  maximize  the 
probability of winning the next election (Nordhaus 1975: 174). In the context of a short-run trade-off  
between  inflation  and  employment  and  with  backward-looking  and  short-sighted  voters,  a  purely 
office-seeking government will pursue an expansionary fiscal policy as it approaches a new election, 
followed  by  a  contraction  immediately  after.2 Straightforwardly,  we  should  therefore  expect  that 
governments will more likely adopt distributive measures as a new election is approaching. In order 
words,
Hypothesis  1: As  a  government  approaches  an  election,  spending  on  and  frequency  of  use  of  
distributive measures increase.
2 This is likely to occur even if voters are not short-sighted, but as long as they are imperfectly informed about government 
performance (see e.g. Cukierman and Meltzer 1986).
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The earlier empirical record of the political business cycle is not particularly strong (see, e.g., Alesina, 
Mirrlees, and Neumann 1989; Alesina, Roubini, and Cohen 1997), but more recent research confirms 
this expectation, in some cases conditional on a fixed exchange rate regime (Clark 2002; Clark and 
Hallerberg 2000; Franzese 2002).3 Rare as it is to come by, cross-country evidence on the electoral 
effect on the adoption of distributive measures however points to the opposite direction. Aydin (2007) 
employs data collected by an ad-hoc OECD project on public support to industry between 1989 and 
1995, and shows that proximity to elections lowers the level of subsidies.
One reason for this unsatisfactory empirical support can be found in how electoral rules structure the 
choice among different types of spending. Faced with an industrial crisis, a government may decide to 
grant a state aid to a company in distress, a typical distributive measure designed to benefit a specific  
geographic constituency and financed through generalized taxation. But the government may also opt 
for a measure of general economic interest, such as increasing unemployment benefits. Aside from the 
impact on broad fiscal aggregates, this choice has a direct bearing on our object of study, the intensity 
and frequency of distributive measures.
According  to  Weingast,  Shepsle  and  Johnsen  (1981),  the  incentives  of  politicians  for  choosing  a 
distributive  measure  increase  with  the  number  of  electoral  districts.  Because  the  benefits  of  such 
measure are concentrated while its costs are shared across all the districts through the mechanism of 
generalized taxation, the higher the number of districts, the higher the district-specific net benefits of 
such  measure.  Politicians  seeking  re-election  in  any  given  district  will  therefore  demand  more 
distributive measures, giving rise to a common-pool problem. Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen (1981) 
assume that legislators adopt measures unanimously, but Persson and Tabellini (1999; 2000) show that 
3 Franzese (2002) is interested in government’s transfers (e.g. social security, pensions, and welfare) over GDP, while Clark  
(2002) and Clark and Hallerberg (2000) in the broader ratio of gross debt to GDP. For single country evidence of electoral 
effects on geographically targeted government spending see the literature cited by Golden and Picci (2008: 268).
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the common pool problem arises also if the assembly decides by majority voting.4 They model two 
pure office-seeking parties that offer a policy platform composed of a group-specific transfer payment 
(i.e., a distributive measure) and a public good.5 For concreteness and with reference to the example 
above,  they model  the choice  between a direct  grant  to  a  company in distress  and an increase  in 
unemployment  benefits.  Persson and Tabellini  (1999;  2000) show that  the  size  of  the  distributive 
transfer is higher, and the provision of the public good is lower, in a polity with three districts (where 
groups coincide with districts) than in one with a single district. Because the votes lost in non-marginal  
districts, following a lower provision of the public good, are not internalized by a party, while each  
district still contribute equally to the budget, the costs of a distributive program is lower in a three-
district than in a single-district polity.6 In sum, some institutional features of the electoral system, such 
as its district magnitude, may discourage the internalization of costs and, therefore, shape the choice 
between  different  types  of  fiscal  measures.  Additionally,  because  distributive  measures  are 
geographically  (district)  targeted,  we  should  also  expect  greater  fragmentation.  We  formulate  the 
following expectation
Hypothesis 2:  The more the electoral system encourages the internalization of costs (the higher the  
district magnitude), the lower the spending on and frequency of use of distributive measures.
Persson and Tabellini (2003: 169-79; 2004) show that countries with majoritarian electoral systems 
spend less on broad (public  good-like)  entitlement  programs, such as  pensions  and unemployment 
insurance,  than  countries  that  employ  proportional  electoral  representation.  However,  no  direct 
4 Majority voting in the legislature is implied by Persson and Tabellini (1999). In a three-district polity, a party needs to win  
in two districts to be in government.
5 The platform includes also rents for politicians and a common tax rate.
6 For an informal, but similar, argument see Lancaster  (1986). Lizzeri and Persico (2001) and Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti and 
Rostagno (2002) produce models with similar conclusions, at least to the extent that we should expect more spending on 
policies with geographically concentrated benefits as the number of electoral districts increases.
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evidence is provided to support the claim that a country with a low cost-internalizing electoral system 
spends more on distributive measures. Since Persson and Tabellini (2003: 169-79; 2004: 169-79) also 
show that the size of government of countries with majoritarian electoral systems is smaller, it may 
well be the case that they spend less. Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti and Rostagno (2002), for instance, fail to 
find corroborating evidence.7
This still weak empirical record may be due to other institutional features of the electoral system that 
condition the preferences of politicians for distributive measures. In addition to how seats are allocated 
among parties, an electoral formula specifies how they are allocated among candidates within parties. 
Carey  and  Shugart  (1995:  417-8)  argues  that  these  rules  ‘affects  the  extent  to  which  individual  
politicians can benefit by developing personal reputations distinct from those of their party’. This is 
important because building a personal reputation is frequently associated with securing policies than 
deliver district-specific benefits  (e.g. Carey and Shugart 1995; Lancaster 1986). Carey and Shugart 
(1995) identify four  institutional  features  that  shape the incentive  to  cultivate  a  personal  vote:  the 
degree of control party leaders exercise over access to their party’s label (ballot); whether votes cast for 
one candidate of a given party also contribute to the number of seats won in the district by the party as 
a whole (pool); whether voters are allowed to cast only a single vote for a party, multiple votes, or a 
single vote for a candidate (votes); and the district magnitude. The incentives to cultivate a personal 
vote,  and  to  pursue  distributive  measures,  increases  with  weaker  ballot  control,  less  pooling  and 
7 More specifically,  Milesi-Ferretti,  Perotti  and Rostagno  (2002) do not find evidence  that  countries  with low district 
magnitude electoral systems spend more on (geographically targeted) purchases of goods and services. They do instead find 
that these countries spend less on transfers, which are not geographically targeted. Total government spending is also lower 
as expected, but only in the subset of OECD countries. Note that these scholars include subsidies to firms in the transfers. In  
our view, subsidies have a strong geographical component. In single country studies, there is evidence instead of targeting 
spending to swing voters in marginal districts (e.g. Dahlberg and Johansson 2002; John and Ward 2001).
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multiple or candidate-level voting, more so as district magnitude increases. Additionally,  we should 
expect these features to increase the fragmentation of distributive measures.
Importantly,  according to Carey and Shugart  (1995), the degree of leaders’ control  over the ballot 
conditions the impact of the district magnitude on these incentives. If leaders have strong control over 
the ballot (e.g. in closed-list systems), the district magnitude operates in the same way as suggested by 
Persson and Tabellini (1999; 2000). But if they have weak control, the higher the district magnitude is, 
the higher the incentives to cultivate a personal vote, exactly the opposite of Persson and Tabellini’s 
expectation.  We can equally expect  fragmentation  to increase.  We formulate  these expectations  as 
follows.
Hypothesis 3:  Hypothesis 2 applies only if party leaders have control over the ballot. Otherwise, as  
district magnitude increases, the higher the spending on and frequency of use of distributive measures.
Hypothesis 4: As the electoral system strengthens the incentives to cultivate a personal vote, the higher  
the district magnitude, the higher the spending on and frequency of use of distributive measures.
Edwards and Thames (2007) find evidence that total and education expenditures increase with district 
magnitude in systems with low incentives to cultivate the personal vote, while they decrease in systems 
with high incentives.8 While the latter result disconfirms Persson and Tabellini’s (public good-related) 
expectation, it does not necessarily confirm Carey and Shugart’s hypotheses, for two reasons. First, 
Edwards and Thames do not test the impact of these electoral institutions on distributive spending. 
Second, Edwards and Thames interact  the district  magnitude with an average score over the three 
dimensions (ballot,  pool and votes), but disregard the conditioning impact of ballot  control alone - 
hypothesis 3 above -, which is one of Carey and Shugart’s (1995: 431) core expectations.
8 Golden and Picci (2008) show that, in the open-list proportional representation (PR) system operating in Italy until 1994, 
individually powerful  politicians  affiliated  with  governing  parties  were  able  to  secure  infrastructure  investment  at  the  
expense of the core areas of ruling party strength.
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Types of government
A government in a parliamentary system needs the support from a legislative majority to stay in office. 
Parties  offer  the  disciplining  and  coordinating  mechanisms  to  form,  sustain  and  dissolve  the 
parliamentary support coalition for the government,  that is,  the set of parliamentarians  expected to 
support government initiatives.  Electoral incentives may not find their way into policy outcomes, at 
least not as expected as in the theories described above, because of the constraints imposed by the need 
to form and sustain an executive.
Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2007) have recently modeled the choice of government parties to spend 
on  group-specific  goods,  under  majoritarian  and  proportional  electoral  systems.  They  show  that 
spending  under  a  two-party  coalition  government  is  higher  than  spending  under  a  single  party 
government,  regardless  of  the  electoral  rules  employed.  This  result  rests  on  the  assumption  of  a 
ministerial  government  and on a common pool problem among government  parties. First,  Persson, 
Roland and Tabellini assume that cabinet ministers solely determine the outcomes of the policies under 
their  jurisdiction,  as  in  Laver  and  Shepsle  (1996). In  a  coalition,  each  government  party  sets 
unilaterally the level of spending on the good benefiting its represented group. Second, because voters 
can discriminate  among  government  parties  in  the  voting  booth,  there  is  higher  intra-government 
competition  in  coalition  than  in  single-party  governments.  And  because  coalition  parties  do  not 
internalize  the  full  cost  of  providing  their  group-specific  goods  borne  by  their  coalition  partners, 
spending is higher in coalition governments.9
The choice variable in this model is a transfer - a local public good - to groups. Under a majoritarian  
electoral system, group members are distributed uniformly across the electoral districts. This is clearly 
different  from the  group-specific  transfer  payment  in  Persson  and  Tabellini  (1999)  where  groups 
coincide with districts and, therefore, the benefits of a measure are geographically concentrated. It is 
9 See Bawn and Rosenbluth (2006) for a less formalized version of this argument.
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not clear if Persson, Roland and Tabellini’s expectation holds in case of a skewed distribution of party 
voters  across  districts,  which  would  approximate  the  scenario  described  in  Persson  and  Tabellini 
(1999). Nevertheless, since the type of government does not affect spending on general public goods 
(Persson,  Roland,  and  Tabellini  2007:  158),  it  should  plausibly  affect  spending  on  distributive 
measures.  We have however no reason to expect  that the type  of government  would also have an 
impact on the fragmentation of government intervention. We expect therefore
Hypothesis 5: Single party majority governments display lower spending on distributive measures.
Bawn  and  Rosenbluth  (2006)  and  Persson,  Roland  and  Tabellini  (2007)  find  evidence  that, 
respectively, the (lagged) number of parties in government and coalition governments increase overall 
spending. Persson, Roland and Tabellini also add that electoral rules affect spending  only indirectly 
through their impact on the size of the party system and, therefore, on the types of government.10
Fiscal institutions
We look now inside executive policymaking of parliamentary democracies. A ministerial government - 
a key assumption of  Persson, Roland and Tabellini  - is Pareto-inferior to a negotiated compromise 
between cabinet members across policies  (Thies 2001). Government parties therefore employ several 
mechanisms, such as coalition policy documents, shadowing junior ministers and interministerial com-
mittees (e.g. Gallagher, Laver, and Mair 2006: 40-43; Müller and Strøm 2000; Thies 2001), to limit the 
drift toward this type of government.
10 More specifically, Persson, Roland and Tabellini show that majoritarian electoral systems and district magnitude are both 
valid instruments for  the types of government  and they do not affect  spending directly.  In  a next step, these scholars 
endogenize the size of  the party system with a model of strategic entry by a party.  Broadly speaking,  they formalize  
Duverger’s (1964) theory. This is why they instrument the type of government with measures of the proportionality of the  
electoral  system.  Their  propositions  rest  however  on  two  important  assumptions.  First,  party  voters  are  distributed  
homogeneously across districts. Second, they assume a four-group (cleavage) polity. As Duverger reminds us, geographical  
concentration of party voters and few cleavages qualify significantly his theory.
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In case of budgeting, a ministerial government is equivalent to the situation in which each minister uni-
laterally sets  the  level  of  spending in  the  policy  area  under  her  jurisdiction,  subject  to  a  govern-
ment-wide budget constraint. Hallerberg, Strauch and von Hagen (2009: 25-26) have recently modeled 
this decentralized budgeting process in which a minister internalizes only the share of the costs of her 
spending programmes that fall on her constituency.
According to these scholars, two alternative mechanisms may be employed to limit  the drift toward 
ministerial government in budgeting. On the one hand, a government may adopt a centralized budget-
ing process where the minister of finance has agenda setting and monitoring power over the spending 
ministers. In this context, the finance minister takes into account the entire cost of the spending pro-
grammes, therefore internalizing the common pool externality of decentralized budgeting (Hallerberg, 
Strauch, and von Hagen 2009: 28-29). This arrangement does not work well (it leads to more spending) 
when there is conflict between the finance minister and her colleagues in the executive, such as in het-
erogeneous government coalitions. In this setting, the finance and spending ministers may not belong to 
the same party and the former is likely to have biased spending preferences.  Hallerberg, Strauch and 
von Hagen show that, for the minister to be delegated agenda setting powers by the other ministers and 
to pursue her spending priorities, she has to agree to a level of spending that is ultimately equivalent to 
a decentralized budgeting process. The rules governing a centralized budgeting process are called del-
egation fiscal institutions by Hallerberg, Strauch and von Hagen. Under this set of institutions, we ex-
pect that it would be harder to spend on state aid when the government is cohesive, while there would 
be no implications for fragmentation.
The alternative to a centralized budget procedure is a budget negotiated among government parties (or 
spending ministers) that internalizes the full cost and is Pareto-superior to the budget produced by the  
decentralized procedure. The set of rules underpinning this budgetary process are called contract fiscal 
institutions. What preclude however a spending minister from reneging on this deal during implementa-
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tion? In other words, how do we avoid a drift toward ministerial government? Crucial here is the cred-
ibility of the mechanism to enforce the agreed-upon budget. According to Hallerberg, Strauch and von 
Hagen  (2009: 36-37), noncompliance can be more credibly sanctioned in a coalition than in single 
party government. Note first that, in this setting, the finance minister has limited powers. If a spending 
minister reneges on the budget agreement, a coalition party can threaten to leave the government. In-
stead, 
‘for a single-party government… the enforcement mechanism of the contract approach is rather 
weak. To see this, consider a single-party government with a weak prime minister and finance minister. 
[If a spending minister reneges on the budget agreement] the other cabinet members cannot credibly 
threaten the defector with dissolution of the government, since they would punish themselves by call-
ing for elections’ (Hallerberg, Strauch, and von Hagen 2009: 37).
Absent a credible threat, ministers will not comply and spending will rise at the level of the decentral-
ized budget procedure. In sum, under this alternative set of institutions, we expect that it  would be 
harder to spend when the government is less cohesive, with no consequences for fragmentation. The 
two expectations are summarized as follows:
Hypothesis 6: As conflict within the government decreases, spending on distributive measures lowers  
under delegation fiscal institutions.
Hypothesis 7: As conflict within the government increases, spending on distributive measures lowers  
under contract fiscal institutions.
Since  single  party  majority  governments  tend  to  display  the  highest  level  of  internal  cohesion, 
hypothesis 6 essentially conditions hypothesis 5 on delegation fiscal institutions.  Hallerberg, Strauch 
and von Hagen (2009: 77-93) show that countries display a significant decrease in the gross debt ratio 
over the gross domestic product (GDP) and an improvement of the budget balance if homogeneous 
governments operate under delegation fiscal institutions and heterogeneous ones operate under contract 
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fiscal  institutions.11 To our knowledge,  no work exists  that  tests  these implications  on government 
spending.
Ideology
The theories we have reviewed rest on the assumption that parties are office-seeking actors that set the 
policies only to maximize the probability of reelection. The partisan theory of macroeconomic policy 
puts  emphasis  on  the  policy-seeking  motivations  of  politicians  (Hibbs  1977).  Because  of  the 
redistributive consequences of economic outcomes on key constituencies, left-wing governments are 
more inclined to pursue expansionary fiscal policies than right-wing governments. In other words, they 
trade  off  lower  unemployment  for  higher  inflation  in  a  (short-run)  Philips  curve-type  of  fashion. 
Within-country partisan differences in policy outputs may persist even controlling for the preferences 
of the median voter which, in a Downsian model of party competition,  would have annulled them 
(Aldrich 1983). We formulate the expectation on the spending bias of left-wing governments as follows 
(we expect no impact for fragmentation).12
Hypothesis  8:  As  government  composition  moves  to  the  left,  spending  on  distributive  measures  
increase.
Empirical evidence does not however point in the same direction.  Garrett  (1998: 76-85) and Clark 
(2002:  59-67)  offer  evidence  of  the  positive  impact  of  a  composite  left-labor  power  index  on 
11 Hallerberg, Strauch and von Hagen also instrument the changes in fiscal institutions with the values the institutional 
variables and debt level of 1991 to deal with the possible endogeneity due to the necessity to comply with the obligations of  
the Treaty of Maastricht. These do not seem to be valid instruments.
12 If  voters  can  rationally  anticipate  government  policies,  Alesina  (1987) argues  that  an  expansionary fiscal  policy is 
pursued by left-wing governments only at the beginning of their term of office (for supportive evidence see Alesina 1989; 
Alesina, Roubini, and Cohen 1997). We do not find support in favor of this expectation.
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government spending, when capital is mobile and trade openness is high. For Franzese (2002: 98-99), 
however, partisanship affects government transfers only weakly.13 
Closer to our interests, the impact of partisanship on spending in distributive measures seems to be 
conditioned by degree of trade openness of a country.  Left-labor power leads to  lower government 
spending on subsidies to industry when trade openness is low and to higher spending when openness is 
high (Clark 2002:  60-66; Garrett  1998:  80-84).  These results  suffer  from two shortcomings.  First, 
Garrett and Clark employ national account statistics on subsidies to industry. These data include only 
cash transfers and ignore other important instruments, such as soft loans and guarantees (Buigues and 
Sekkat 2010). Second, the left-labor power index aggregates six distinct attributes, such as a left-right 
indicator for the legislature (seat-weighted) and for the executive (portfolio-weighted), union density 
and the share of unionized workers who are member of the largest labor confederation. It is unclear 
which one of these attributes actually matters.14
Data
State aid in the EU fits nicely Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen’s (1981: 644) definition of distributive 
policy. According to administrative practice and case law, four criteria need to be met for a measure to  
be  considered  a  state  aid.  The  measure  needs  to  provide  an,  otherwise  unattainable,  economic 
advantage to the beneficiary. It must be selective. That is, it must be granted to a specific company, a 
group of companies, an economic sector or a geographical area.15 It must be state funded and, lastly, it 
13 Partisanship instead does not seem to interact in a significant way with the exchange rate regime in affecting spending 
(Clark 2002: 75) and, under capital mobility, it appears also to have a limited effect on the debt-GDP ratio (Boix 2000: 64).
14 Boix (2000: 61) does not find robust results in a test on the debt GDP ratio after separating political from labor market  
attributes. We do not find evidence of a significant interactive effect of ideology and trade openness on spending.
15 Article 107 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) states that aid that may be compatible with 
EU  law  includes  measures  that  promote  the  economic  development  of  poorer  areas  or  regions,  that  facilitate  the  
development of certain economic areas and that promote the execution of important public works.
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must potentially distort competition and trade across the EU (Buts, Jegers, and Joris 2010: 3). An aid is 
therefore a state funded measure that provides a selective financial benefit to social groups that are 
relatively  geographically  concentrated  and  easy  to  identify.  Although  diffuse  groups,  such  as 
consumers, may also benefit from such measure, taxpayers always foot the bill. Importantly, measures 
that are not selective are not considered state aid. The last criterion implies that we focus on measures 
above a given spending threshold.16
Employing data on state aid in the EU offer several advantages. First, they are comprehensive in terms 
of coverage of transactions and economic sectors. National account statistics, for instance, are limited 
to cash subsidies, while they disregard loans, guarantees and other transactions. Data available from the 
WTO and the OECD cover only aid to industry; they are less consistent and/or limited to few years 
(Buigues and Sekkat 2010). Second, a government can grant a state aid only upon notification to and 
approval by the European Commission.17 Cross-national data are therefore highly comparable because 
a supranational bureaucracy is in charge of enforcing EU law and ensuring that these measures fall 
under exactly the same legal parameters. Third, with the adoption of  Council Regulation  659/1999, 
which further codified the procedure of state aid control, we can now collect systematic information on 
the frequency of adoption of distributive measures across EU countries. 
We have collected data on the national expenditure on aid of twenty-six EU member states18 for the 
period between 1992 (or their year of accession) and 2009, available from the State aid Scoreboard - a 
16 Currently, such threshold is set at €200000, over any period of three fiscal years, for aid (€100000 for road transport aid)  
and €1.5 million for loan guarantees (Commission Regulation 1998/20006).
17 In exceptional circumstances, the EU Council of Ministers may unanimously approve a proposed measure.  The regulation 
on state aid is based on Articles 107 to 109 of the TFEU.
18 Cyprus is excluded because it has a presidential system. Semi-presidential (or mixed) systems are included because the  
executive depends on the support of a legislative majority to stay in office. Malta is excluded from models 5 to 10 on  
expenditure (Table 2) because we do not have data on fiscal institutions.
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benchmarking  database  developed  by  the  Commission  in  July  2001.  State  aid  expenditure  is  the 
expenditure on state aid to industry and services, in a given year and country, divided by the gross 
domestic  product.  Additionally,  from  March  1999  onwards,  each  application  to  grant  state  aid  is 
documented in an online database and it is therefore possible to collect information on the frequency of 
use of distributive measures across member states. State aid applications is the natural logarithm of the 
number applications (plus one) for new state aid to industry and services, by a given country in a given  
year.19
Countries  make  extensive  use  of  policies  that  employ  public  funds  for  the  benefit  of  specific 
geographical constituencies. Since 1992, EU governments have spent every year 0.53 percent of their 
GDP on average on distributive measures – more than 320 billion US dollars. Between 1999 and 2009, 
they have logged 3,077 applications to grant new aid to industry and services (thirteen new measures 
per country every year). These aggregate figures hide significant variations. For instance in Belgium, 
government spending, as proportion of GDP, is on average twice as much as it is in the Netherlands 
and about one third less than in France. The proportion of government spending in Hungary is almost  
twice as it  is  in  Poland.  Despite  the smaller  size of the economy,  Spanish governments  apply,  on 
average,  for  more  measures  than  Italian  ones,  and  Belgian  governments  for  more  measures  than 
Swedish ones.
19 The Scoreboard can be accessed at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/studies_reports/expenditure.html. The online 
database  is  accessible  at  http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm.  Data  have  been  collected  between  the 
September 2009 and January 2010. The Commission approves, sometimes subject to conditions, more than 90 percent of 
these applications. We included also those few proposed measures that were not eventually implemented because we are 
interested in the national  propensity to grant aid.  In  a few cases,  more than one file was opened with regard to same 
measure, maybe because resubmission was necessary for administrative reasons. We counted the first application only. Both 
spending and applications related the 2008-9 financial crisis are excluded because those measures were designed to remedy 
a serious economy-wide disturbance and therefore were not geographically targeted.
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We have then produced several explanatory variables.  Preelection takes the value of one in the year 
preceding an election in a given country and zero in the other years. In the election year, the value is 
the  weighted  pre-election  period  of  the  year.20 According  to  hypothesis  1,  Preelection should  be 
positively associated with state aid expenditure and applications.
For  hypothesis  2,  we have  first  calculated  the  district  magnitude  for  each  electoral  system that  a 
country  has  employed  in  the  time  period  of  interest.  In  case  of majoritarian  and  proportional 
representation  systems,  the  magnitude  of  the  average  district  results  from dividing  the  number  of 
assembly seats by the number of electoral districts, at the electoral tier at which votes are translated into 
seats. For (proportional) multi-tier systems and mixed systems, we first computed the magnitude of 
each tier by dividing the number of seats assigned or won at a given tier in a given election by the 
number of electoral districts at that tier. We have then summed the resulting tier-level values, weighted 
by  the  proportion  of  tier-level  seats  over  the  assembly  size.21 This  (weighted)  average  district 
20 As in Franzese (2002: 78), it equals to (number of completed pre-election months/12) + (number of pre-election days in 
the  incomplete  month/total  number  of  days  in  the  incomplete  month)/12.  This  formula  is  also  used  when  any  other  
explanatory variable changes during a given year. The value in this year is the time-weighted sum of pre-change and post-
change values. For instance, if a change of government has occurred in a given year, the variable measuring government 
preferences is the sum of the two (or more) governmental positions, weighted by the yearly share of time in office of each  
government.
21 For instance, in the 2003 Estonian elections of the 101-seat Riigikogu, 74 seats were allocated at the 12 lower tier districts 
and  the  remaining  27  ‘compensation  mandates’  were  assigned  at  the  single  nation-wide  district.  The  average  district  
magnitude was therefore [(74/12) × (74/101)] + (27×27/101) = 11.74. In Sweden, there are 39 ‘adjustment’ seats allocated  
nation-wide and 310 assigned to 29 districts, the magnitude is [(310/29) × (310/349)] + (39×39/349) = 13.85. The weighting  
tends to increase the magnitude capturing more internalization of costs. The tier at which votes are converted into seats is  
crucial because this is where costs are internalized. This can have important consequences. For instance, the allocation of 
the PR seats in Bulgaria, Italy and Germany is based on nation-wide results. Finally,  in systems where bonus seats are  
assigned to the largest party (for instance in Greece since 2007), we deduct the number of bonus seats from the number of  
seats  at  the  lowest  tier  and  from the  assembly  size.  This  results  in  a  lower  magnitude  value,  therefore  capturing  the 
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magnitude  has a  lower boundary of  one and an upper  boundary that  is  a positive  function of  the 
assembly size. Since we have no reasons to expect that countries with larger assemblies are better at 
internalizing costs, we have normalized this measure of district magnitude by the assembly size (i.e. 
magnitude × 100/assembly size). The resulting normalized values of  District magnitude range from 
close to zero to 100. Higher values of District magnitude should be negatively associated with state aid 
expenditure and applications. However, according to  Carey and Shugart (1995), this applies only if 
party leaders have control  over the ballot.  Otherwise,  District  magnitude should display a positive 
association with expenditure and applications. The conditioning variable in this latter  hypothesis  3, 
Ballot control, is an indicator that takes the value of one if a large majority of the members of the 
assembly are elected under a closed-list electoral system.22
For hypothesis 4, we employ the data on electoral systems and the personal vote developed by Johnson, 
Wallack and their colleagues (Johnson and Wallack 2007; Wallack, Gaviria, Panizza, and Stein 2003). 
These scholars have produced average values across electoral tiers, weighted by the share of members 
that originate from each tier, for the three institutional features - district magnitude aside - identified by 
Carey and Shugart’s (1995) as shaping the incentives to cultivate a personal vote. Following Edwards 
and Thames (2007), Personal vote is the average of the three values taken by the scores on ballot, pool 
and votes. It should be positively  associated with expenditure and applications, as district magnitude 
increases.
majoritarian effect of bonus seats. We use data available from Golder (2005), Birch (2001), the election reports of Electoral  
Studies, and the political data yearbooks of the European Journal of Political Research. In bicameral systems, we use data 
only from the lower chamber.
22 Unlike Carey and Shugart (1995), a single member district electoral system is not considered closed-list for this purpose.  
Wallack et al (2003: 137) argue that coding these systems as closed-list overemphasizes the control that parties have over 
the ballot, compared to that of voters. Some multi-member district systems are closed-list but have a few single member 
districts (2 in Slovenia, 2 in Spain, 31 in Bulgaria in 2009 and 1 Italy from 2006). They are nevertheless coded as one  
because the large majority of the members (e.g. more than 87 percent in Bulgaria) are elected under closed-list.
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We need a  measurement  of  government  preferences  to  test  hypotheses  5 to  8.  State  aid  policy is 
underpinned  by  the  traditional  left-right  economic  cleavage  which  pits  market  liberals  against 
interventionists; those favoring a small state and low taxation against the supporters of public spending 
and intervention in the economy. To measure the positions of governments, we employ the “taxes v. 
spending” dimension  used by Laver  and Hunt (1992) and  Benoit  and Laver  (2006) in  their  expert 
surveys on party positions. The dimension ranges from 1 for a party that promotes raising taxes to 
increase public services to 20 for one that promotes cutting public services to cut taxes.  Government  
preference is the sum of the positions of each government party along this dimension, weighted by its 
share of ministerial portfolios. According to hypothesis 8, it should be negatively associated with aid 
spending.  Government  range is  instead the  absolute  difference  among  the  extreme  positions  of 
government parties along such dimension.23 This variable takes the values of zero in case of single 
party majority governments and it is therefore highly negatively correlated with an indicator variable 
for these types of governments (p < 0.01). Following hypotheses 5 and, conditionally, 6, Government 
range should therefore be positively associated with aid expenditure.
What  remains  is  the  operationalization  of  fiscal  institutions  operating  in  a  country.  We  use  the 
aggregate  scores  for  delegation  and contract  institutions provided  by Hallerberg,  Strauch  and von 
Hagen  (2009) and,  for  eastern  European  member  states,  by  Hallerberg  and  Yläoutinen  (2010). 
Delegation is an index that takes into account the extent to which a) budget negotiations in the cabinet 
are centralized by the ministry of finance, b) the parliament cannot affect the budget structure and c) it  
is  difficult  to  change  the  budget  once  adopted.  According  to  hypothesis  6,  Government  range is 
23 For minority governments, we computed the government range on the basis of the parliamentary support coalition. In  
addition to government parties, they include either those which supported the formal government investiture, those which 
offered  external  support  or,  as  a  last  resort,  those  closest  to  the  government  parties  on the economic  left-right  scale. 
Information on government composition, portfolios, parliamentary seats, external support and vote of investiture is taken  
from the political data yearbooks of the European Journal of Political Research.
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positively associated with aid expenditure only for high values of  Delegation. Contract  is instead an 
index that  measures  the  extent  to  which  a  country  uses  multiannual  budget  plans.24 Hypothesis  8 
suggests that Government range is negatively associated with aid spending for high values of Contract.
Finally, as most studies on government spending, we control for the lagged values of the per capita 
GDP, the real GDP growth rate and the degree of trade openness (the sum of import and export over 
GDP). Moreover, the consequences of a loose fiscal policy differ depending on the exchange rate re-
gime a government adopts. According to the Mundell-Fleming model, under full capital mobility, gov-
ernment spending increases output if a country operates under a fixed exchange rate regime, but it has 
no effect under a flexible regime.25 We include therefore an indicator variable  that takes the value of 
one for the time periods a country has joined the Economic and Monetary Union, and zero otherwise. 
Finally, we add a control variable for the time periods following the adoption of Regulation 659/1999, 
de facto a time fixed effect. For the analysis on applications, we expect that governments of larger and, 
given our focus on industry and services, more industrialized economies to adopt more measures. We 
therefore include the lagged values of the (log of) GDP and the agriculture value added as share of the 
GDP. Descriptive statistics of the variables we employ in the analysis are illustrated in Table 1.
< TABLE 1 HERE > 
24 The  variable  is  called  ‘targets’  by  Hallerberg,  Strauch  and  von Hagen  (2009) and  ‘contracts 1’  by  Hallerberg  and 
Yläoutinen  (2010). A more encompassing index for contracts, employed by Hallerberg, Strauch and von Hagen  (2009), 
shares some of the attributes with the delegation index and the two should not be used in the same regression model.
25 For instance, Boix (2000: 64) shows that countries operating under a fixed exchange rate regime tend to run higher debt-
GDP ratios. No doubt, the growth and stability pact has been designed to prevent exactly this outcome, but it remains to be  
seen how effective it has been.
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Results
Electoral and fiscal institutions and expenditure on distributive measures
The nature of our datasets is time-series cross-sectional, with the latter property becoming predominant 
over time. The number of countries begins with twelve in 1992 and increases to twenty-five (twenty-six 
in the applications dataset) as new states joined the EU. In preliminary analyses of the expenditure 
dataset, the Breusch-Pagan test indicates heteroskedasticity. We therefore employ regressions with pan-
el corrected standard errors which perform well when the number of years and units are similar. Since 
we also find evidence of autocorrelation,  we estimate these models  with first-order autocorrelation 
AR(1) with a common coefficient across countries (Beck and Katz 1995). We report the results of 
models both with and without country fixed effects. Although fixed effects are designed to deal with 
omitted variable bias, they come at a significant cost for our study. In these models, the estimated effect 
of the independent variables is solely based on information about how they affect changes in spending 
and applications within a single country, ignoring both level effects and cross-country variation. This is 
particularly problematic for our institutional variables, not only because their cross-country impact is 
substantively interesting but also because these variables change slowly over time and their within-
country impact may be negligible. Moreover, although the theories discussed above do not differentiate 
clearly, it is plausible to suspect that some independent variables may also display level effects (Beck 
and Katz 2004; Plumper, Troeger, and Manow 2005).26
< TABLE 2 HERE > 
Table 2 presents the results of five Prais-Winsten regressions, with and without country fixed effects. 
Models 1 and 2 include only the variables that have a direct effect on spending. They are therefore a 
test of hypotheses 1, 2, 5 and 8. Models 3 and 4 add the interactive effects of electoral institutions as 
26 We also must note that one of independent variables that we employ, eurozone, operates like a group fixed effect vari-
able. Hence the results of models with country fixed effects may have to be interpreted with some caution.
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formulated by hypotheses 3 and 4. Models 5 and 6 add the interactive effects of fiscal institutions as 
formulated by hypotheses 5 and 6. Finally, following Hallerberg, Strauch and von Hagen (2009),  the 
remaining models  7  to  10 rerun models  5  and 6 only for  expected  delegation  and contract  coun-
try-years.27
We do not find evidence in favor of hypotheses 1 and 8. Closeness to elections and the ideological ori-
entation of governments do not have an impact on spending on distributive measures. Hypothesis 5 is 
also disconfirmed. More cohesive executives, such as single party majority governments, do not spend 
less. In model 3 of Table 2, we actually find some (weak) evidence to the contrary, but this impact is 
not robust in the other specifications.28
In line with hypotheses 2, we find for the first time direct evidence that district magnitude is an elector-
al institution that facilitates the internalization of costs. On average, a standard deviation increase in 
normalized District magnitude, equivalent to the difference between the German and the French elect-
oral systems, accounts for a 0.08 – 0.09 decrease in the percentage of state aid expenditure over GDP. 
This is equivalent to a reduction in spending of approximately between 27 and 29 billion U.S. dollars  
per year for the average European economy.
Partially as hypothesis 3 contends, district magnitude affects spending in combination with other elect-
oral institutions. Its impact is much larger if candidates are elected under a closed-list electoral system. 
In these circumstances, a standard deviation increase in magnitude accounts for a 0.15 – 0.22 decrease 
in the percentage of expenditure, equivalent to between 48 and 71 billion U.S. dollars.29 Note however 
27 Observations with below average values of  Government range fall under the expected delegation subset, those above 
under the expected contract one. This subdivision is very similar to the one employed by Hallerberg, Strauch and von Hagen 
(2009: 50).
28 The result holds if we substitute Government range with an indicator variable for single party majority governments.
29 Only model 5 does not confirm this result, but, as it can be seen below, this model includes fiscal institutions that do not  
behave as expected in the full dataset.
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that there is no evidence in support of the second part of hypothesis 3. An increase in district magnitude 
does not lead to more spending when party leaders have no control over the ballot.
< FIGURE 1 HERE >
Figure 1 presents the marginal effect of district magnitude on spending, as incentives to cultivate per-
sonal votes vary across the observable range of values. The other variables are set at their means, while 
the gray area covers the 95% confidence interval. Such incentives and district magnitude do not interact 
positively as hypothesis 4 suggests. We have a different dynamics. In electoral systems where there are 
weak incentives, an increase in district magnitude lowers spending. Compare for instance the post-2006 
Italian and the Portuguese electoral systems. These systems display very low incentives to cultivate 
personal votes, but the Italian one has a much higher magnitude. This could partially account for the 
fact that spending on distributive measures, as share of GDP, is three times higher in Portugal. The 
curves in Figure 1 however are either flat or downward sloping. In other words, there is no evidence  
that an increase in magnitude leads to more spending at high incentives to cultivate the personal vote.
In sum, two electoral institutions, district magnitude and ballot control, have the greatest impact on 
spending. We find conditional support of Persson and Tabellini’s (1999; 2000) argument on the negat-
ive impact that district magnitude should have on spending. Higher district magnitude leads to less 
spending on distributive measures if party leaders control access to the ballot rank. Otherwise, it has no 
effect. This latter result also means that Carey and Shugart (1995) are only partially correct. As they 
predict, when an increase in magnitude is associated with a lack of incentives to cultivate personal 
votes, spending on distributive measures is reduced. But when such incentives are present, we do not 
find evidence that they positively interact with increases in magnitude.
As far as the control variables are concerned, their impact on spending is limited and operates solely 
within countries. As a country gets richer, it spends slightly more on distributive measures. A country 
like France would increase spending by about 29 billion US dollar across the entire period (an increase 
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of 0.09  percentage  points).  We also see  an  increase  in  spending after  the  adoption  of  Regulation 
659/1999 (0.19 percentage points, 61 billion US dollar). Perhaps surprisingly, joining the Economic 
and Monetary Union leads a country to cut spending on distributive measures, by approximately 0.41 
percentage points (about 133 billion US dollar). The fiscal framework surrounding the single European 
currency appears to undercut the incentives to run looser fiscal policies that the Mundell-Fleming mod-
el purports. These effects disappear across countries however; hence, they need to be interpreted with 
caution. Richer countries do not spend on distributive measures more than poorer ones, and those that  
have adopted the euro do not spend less than those which have not. The time impact following the ad-
option of the regulation also disappears.
< FIGURE 2 HERE >
We move on now to models 5 to 10 of Table 2. Fiscal institutions do not operate as expected in models  
5 and 6 but, as Hallerberg, Strauch and von Hagen (2009: 81-92) find, they do so in some of the models 
that include a subset of cases. Figure 2 presents the marginal effect of delegation and contract institu-
tions on spending, as government range varies across the observable set of values. The other variables 
are set at their means, while the gray area covers the 95% confidence interval. Take models 7 and 8 in 
Table 2, where only delegation states are included. In single party majority governments, where gov-
ernment range takes the value of zero, an increase of the index of delegation fiscal institutions from its 
minimum to its maximum lowers spending by 0.51 – 0.66 percentage points, between 164 and 214 bil-
lion U.S. dollars. In these circumstances,  an increase of the index of contract fiscal institutions  in-
creases spending by 0.82 – 1.07 percentage points (266 - 347 billion U.S. dollars). However, in case of 
a coalition government, such as the socialist-liberal coalition that ruled Hungary from 2004 onwards, 
an increase of delegation fiscal institutions leads to more spending (0.006-0.009 percentage point, 2-3 
billion U.S. dollars) and an increase of contract fiscal institutions leads to less spending (0.005 percent-
age point, 2 billion U.S. dollars in model 8).
23
The two panels in the upper part of Figure 2 show these results. The curve of the marginal effect of del-
egation fiscal institutions cuts across the zero line and displays an upward slope as government range 
increases. As hypothesis 6 suggests, the adoption of delegation fiscal institutions reduces spending in 
single party majority or cohesive coalition governments. It instead increases spending in more hetero-
geneous coalitions. The curve of the marginal effect of contract fiscal institutions also cuts across the 
zero line, but it displays a downward slope as the range increases. Contract fiscal institutions therefore 
increase spending in single party majority or cohesive coalition governments. In line with hypothesis 7, 
these institutions reduce spending in heterogeneous coalitions.
Results however are not confirmed in models 9 and 10 of Table 2, where only contract states are in-
cluded. No support is found in favor of hypothesis 7. Contract institutions do not appear to reduce 
spending  in  more  heterogeneous  governments.  Additionally,  if  highly  heterogeneous  governments, 
such as some of the Belgian, Finnish or Italian coalitions, adopt more delegation fiscal institutions,  
spending decreases by 0.006 percentage points (2 billion U.S. dollars). This is illustrated in the bottom 
left panel of Figure 2. At high levels of intra-government conflict, the adoption of delegation fiscal in-
stitutions leads to a reduction in spending.
In sum, fiscal institutions affect spending, but only under specific circumstances. In single party major-
ity or cohesive coalition governments, if the budget is adopted and implemented prevalently under del-
egation rather than contract fiscal institutions, spending on distributive measures is reduced. If the op-
posite were true, we would find more spending. In other types of government, fiscal institutions do not 
appear to operate in a unique way.
Electoral institutions and fragmentation of distributive measures
Table 3 presents the results of three OLS regressions, with and without country fixed effects, on the 
number of applications. Models 1 and 2 are a test of hypotheses 1 and 2. Models 3 and 4 add hypothes-
is 3, while models 5 and 6 add hypothesis 4. 
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< TABLE 3 HERE > 
We do not find evidence in favor of the first two hypotheses. As an election approaches, countries do 
not adopt more measures and district magnitude per se does not reduce fragmentation. Electoral institu-
tions operate in the more complex way described in hypothesis 3. If party leaders have control over the  
ballot, a standard deviation increase in district magnitude reduces the number of distributive measures, 
by not a large amount however – less than a measure a year. But when these leaders cannot control the 
ballot rank in electoral list systems, a standard deviation increase in magnitude leads more fragmenta-
tion – less than one more measure in model 3, ten more measures in model 6. This is no small amount,  
considering that, on average, the typical country adopts thirteen measures a year. However, this large 
effect is only relevant to the within-country specification (model 6), hence to the limited cases where a 
country, such as Italy, Belgium and Romania, experienced a change in district magnitude and ballot 
control provisions.
< FIGURE 3 HERE >
Figure 3 presents the marginal effect of district  magnitude on the number of measures, at different 
levels of incentives to cultivate personal votes. As in Figure 1, the other variables are set at their means 
and the gray area covers the 95% confidence interval. Also in this circumstance we have a different dy-
namics from the one predicted by hypothesis 4. When leaders can exercise strong ballot control, an in-
crease in district magnitude lowers fragmentation in electoral systems with weak incentives (top panel 
in Figure 3). Compare again the post-2006 Italian and the Portuguese electoral systems - with similarly 
low incentives to cultivate personal votes, but a much higher magnitude in Italy. Considering that the 
Italian economy is fourteen times the size of the Portuguese one and, proportionally, only half as much 
is based on agriculture, we find on average only 27 Italian measures compared to seven Portuguese 
ones.
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We do not find evidence however of the positive interaction between magnitude and incentives. Actu-
ally, in the within-country specification (model 6), the curve is downward sloping, meaning that an in-
crease in  magnitude  reduces  fragmentation,  more  so at  high incentives  to  cultivate  personal  votes 
(middle panel). Eleven countries, with relatively high incentives, have experienced changes in district 
magnitude in this time period. In five cases, the electoral system was modified while, in the remaining 
ones, new districts were established or the number of compensation seats changed. Overall, the effects 
of these modifications on the district magnitude were generally small in size (with the only exception 
of Belgium in 2003) and the related impact on the number of measures was equally small, never ex-
ceeding one more measure a year. Finally, the bottom panel of Figure 2 shows, as hypothesis 3 sug-
gests, that an increase in magnitude leads to more measures when party leaders cannot control the bal-
lot rank. But such effect diminishes as the incentives to cultivate the personal vote increase, again dis-
confirming hypothesis 4.
In sum, district magnitude and ballot control are again the two most important electoral institutions 
determining the number of distributive measures countries adopt. The results are less robust than in the 
analysis on expenditure because we cover a shorter time period. Also, because these institutions either 
remain invariant or change slowly over time, their effect is more noticeable in model 3 which excludes 
fixed effects. If party leaders have control over the ballot, an increase in district magnitude reduces the 
number of distributive measures. If they do not enjoy such control, an increase in magnitude leads to 
more fragmentation.  The other institutions  that  shape the incentives  to cultivate  the personal  vote, 
included in models 5 and 6, do not behave as expected.
Conclusions
These findings have important implications for the study of the institutional determinants of policy 
outcomes. First, we provide for the first time evidence, across several countries and several years, of 
how electoral and fiscal institutions affect spending on and frequency of use of distributive measures.  
26
This was possible because the EU policy on state aid control offers comparable country-level data on 
this type of measures. Second, in line with the expectation of Persson and Tabellini (1999; 2000), we 
have shown that, in countries where  the number of legislators elected from the districts is relatively 
high on average, spending on distributive measures is proportionally lower because legislators’ demand 
is more likely to factor in their cost for the taxpayer. However, as Carey and Shugart (1995) argue, to 
have such an effect,  district  magnitude must  be associated with another  electoral  institution:  ballot 
control. If party leaders cannot control access to the ballot rank, such as in open-list electoral systems, 
the politicians’ incentives to pursue personal votes heighten the demand for distributive measures, thus 
offsetting the impact of larger magnitude. Where party leaders control access instead, an increase in 
district  magnitude  reduces  spending as  expected.  In  these  circumstances,  fewer  measures  are  also 
adopted.  There  is  also,  less  robust,  evidence  that  more  measures  are  adopted  if  an  increase  in 
magnitude is  associated with lack of ballot  control. Finally,  we have shown that fiscal  institutions 
operate along the lines suggested by Hallerberg, Strauch and von Hagen (2009) only in case of single 
party majority or cohesive coalition governments. Greater reliance on delegation rather than contract 
fiscal institutions leads to lower spending on distributive measures.
In  conclusion,  besides  social  welfare  or  economic  efficiency  considerations,  electoral  and  fiscal 
institutions  systematically  structure  the  incentives  of  politicians  to  adopt  geographically  targeted 
measures.
References
Aldrich, John H. 1983. “A Downsian Spatial Model with Party Activism.” The American Political  
Science Review 77(4): 974-990.
Alesina, Alberto. 1987. “Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a Repeated Game.” The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 102(3): 651-678.
27
Alesina, Alberto. 1989. “Politics and Business Cycles in Industrial Democracies.” Economic Policy 
4(8): 57-98.
Alesina, Alberto, James Mirrlees, and Manfred J. M. Neumann. 1989. “Politics and Business Cycles in 
Industrial Democracies.” Economic Policy 4(8): 57-98.
Alesina, Alberto, Nouriel Roubini, and Gerald Cohen. 1997. Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy. 
Cambridge: MIT Press.
Aydin, Umut. 2007. “Promoting industries in the global economy: subsidies in OECD - countries, 1989 
to 1995.” Journal of European Public Policy 14(1): 115-131.
Bawn, Kathleen, and Frances Rosenbluth. 2006. “Short versus Long Coalitions: Electoral 
Accountability and the Size of the Public Sector.” American Journal of Political Science 50(2): 
251-265.
Beck, Nathaliel, and Jonathan N Katz. 2004. “Time-Series-Cross-Section Issues: Dynamics, 2004.” 
The Society for Political Methodology. Working Paper.
Beck, Nathaliel, and Jonathan N Katz. 1995. “What to Do (and Not to Do) with Time-Series Cross-
Section Data.” American Political Science Review 89(September): 634-647.
Benoit, Kenneth, and Michael Laver. 2006. Party Policy in Modern Democracies. London: Routledge.
Birch, Sarah. 2001. “Electoral systems and party systems in Europe East and West.” Perspectives on 
European Politics and Society 2(3): 355.
Boix, Carles. 2000. “Partisan Governments, the International Economy, and Macroeconomic Policies 
in Advanced Nations, 1960-93.” World Politics 53(1): 38-73.
Buigues, Pierre-André, and Khalid Sekkat. 2010. “Public Subsidies to Business: An International 
Comparison.” Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade 11(1): 1-24.
Buts, Caroline, Marc Jegers, and Tony Joris. 2010. “Determinants of the European Commission’s State 
Aid Decisions.” Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade Online First™, 6 November 2010.
28
Carey, J.M., and M.S. Shugart. 1995. “Incentives to cultivate a personal vote: A rank ordering of 
electoral formulas.” Electoral Studies 14(4): 417-439.
Clark, William Roberts. 2002. Capitalism, Not Globalism: Capital Mobility, Central Bank  
Independence, and the Political Control of the Economy. Ann Arbor, MI: University of 
Michigan Press.
Clark, William Roberts, and Mark Hallerberg. 2000. “Mobile Capital, Domestic Institutions, and 
Electorally Induced Monetary and Fiscal Policy.” American Political Science Review 94(2): 
323-346.
Cukierman, Alex, and Allan H. Meltzer. 1986. “A Positive Theory of Discretionary Policy, the Cost of 
Democratic Government and the Benefits of a Constitution.” Economic Inquiry 24(3): 367-388.
Dahlberg, Matz, and Eva Johansson. 2002. “On the Vote-Purchasing Behavior of Incumbent 
Governments.” American Political Science Review 96(1): 27-40.
Duverger, Maurice. 1964. Political Parties. 3rd ed. London: Methuen.
Edwards, Martin S., and Frank C. Thames. 2007. “District magnitude, personal votes, and government 
expenditures.” Electoral Studies 26(2): 338-345.
Franzese, Robert J. Jr. 2002. Macroeconomic Policies in Developed Democracies. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Gallagher, Michael, Michael Laver, and Peter Mair. 2006. Representative Government in Modern 
Europe. 4th ed. London: McGraw-Hill.
Garrett, Geoffrey. 1998. Partisan Politics in the Global Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
Golden, Miriam A, and Lucio Picci. 2008. “Pork-Barrel Politics in Postwar Italy, 1953-94.” American 
Journal of Political Science 52(2): 268-289.
29
Golder, Matt. 2005. “Democratic electoral systems around the world, 1946-2000.” Electoral Studies 
24(1): 103-121.
Hallerberg, Mark, Rolf Rainer Strauch, and Jürgen von Hagen. 2009. Fiscal Governance in Europe. 
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Hallerberg, Mark, and Sami Yläoutinen. 2010. “Political Power, Fiscal Institutions and Budgetary 
Outcomes in Central and Eastern Europe.” Journal of Public Policy 30(1): 45-62.
Hibbs, Douglas A. 1977. “Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy.” The American Political  
Science Review 71(4): 1467-1487.
John, Peter, and Hugh Ward. 2001. “Political manipulation in a majoritarian democracy: central 
government targeting of public funds to English subnational government, in space and across 
time.” The British Journal of Politics & International Relations 3(3): 308-339.
Johnson, Joel W, and Jessica Seddon Wallack. 2007. “Electoral Systems and the Personal Vote.” 
http://polisci2.ucsd.edu/jwjohnson/espv.htm (Accessed September 27, 2010).
Lancaster, Thomas D. 1986. “Electoral Structures and Pork Barrel Politics.” International Political  
Science Review / Revue internationale de science politique 7(1): 67-81.
Laver, Michael, and William Ben Hunt. 1992. Policy and Party Competition. London: Routledge.
Laver, Michael, and Kenneth A Shepsle. 1996. Making and Breaking Governments: Cabinets and 
Legislatures in Parliamentary Democracies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lizzeri, Alessandro, and Nicola Persico. 2001. “The Provision of Public Goods under Alternative 
Electoral Incentives.” The American Economic Review 91(1): 225-239.
Milesi-Ferretti, Gian Maria, Roberto Perotti, and Massimo Rostagno. 2002. “Electoral Systems and 
Public Spending.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 117(2): 609-657.
Müller, Wolfgang C, and Kaare Strøm, eds. 2000. Coalition Governments in Western Europe. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
30
Nordhaus, William D. 1975. “The Political Business Cycle.” The Review of Economic Studies 42(2): 
169-190.
Persson, Torsten, Gerard Roland, and Guido Tabellini. 2007. “Electoral Rules and Government 
Spending in Parliamentary Democracies.” Quarterly Journal of Political Science 2(2): 155-188.
Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini. 2004. “Constitutional Rules and Fiscal Policy Outcomes.” The 
American Economic Review 94(1): 25-45.
Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini. 2000. Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy. 
Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini. 2003. The Economic Effects of Constitutions. Cambridge, 
Mass.: The MIT Press.
Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini. 1999. “The Size and Scope of Government: Comparative 
Politics with Rational Politicians.” European Economic Review 43(4-6): 699-735.
Plumper, Thomas, Vera E. Troeger, and Philip Manow. 2005. “Panel data analysis in comparative 
politics: Linking method to theory.” European Journal of Political Research 44(2): 327-354.
Thies, Michael F. 2001. “Keeping Tabs on Partners: The Logic of Delegation in Coalition 
Governments.” American Journal of Political Science 45(3): 580-598.
Wallack, Jessica Seddon, Alejandro Gaviria, Ugo Panizza, and Ernesto Stein. 2003. “Particularism 
around the World.” The World Bank Economic Review 17(1): 133 -143.
Weingast, Barry R., Kenneth A. Shepsle, and Christopher Johnsen. 1981. “The Political Economy of 




TABLE 1. Descriptive statistics
Variable Description Mean St.dev. Min Max
State aid expenditure Expenditure on aid to industry and services over GDP 0.53 0.45 0.05 3.36
State aid applications ln(number of applications + 1) 2.19 1.02 0.00 4.42
Preelection 1 in preelection year, time-weighted share of 1 in election year, 0 otherwise 0.39 0.44 0.00 1.00
Government preference Portfolio-weighted position of government parties on taxes-spending dimension 11.22 2.77 5.80 17.21
District magnitude Tier-weighted average district magnitude, normalized by assembly size 16.57 27.99 0.15 100.00
Personal vote Incentives to cultivate personal votes. Average of scores on ballot, pool and votes 0.79 0.43 0.00 1.67
Ballot control 1 if majority of assembly members are elected under a closed-list electoral system, 0 otherwise 0.19 0.39 0 1
Government range Absolute difference between extreme positions of government parties on taxes-spending dimension 4.72 3.71 0.00 12.59
Contract Aggregate score for contract fiscal institutions 0.68 0.26 0.00 1.00
Delegation Aggregate score for delegation fiscal institutions 0.56 0.17 0.23 0.90
GDP per capita GPD per capita, at t-1 26169.16 15155.86 4101.16 119137.40
GDP growth rate Real GDP growth rate, at t-1 3.28 2.62 -5.13 12.23
Trade openness Sum of import and export over GDP, at t-1 99.06 54.16 35.39 326.76
Eurozone 1  if a country is member of EMU, 0 otherwise 0.42 0.49 0 1
Regulation 1 for time periods following adoption of Regulation 659/1999, 0 otherwise 0.69 0.45 0 1
GDP ln(GDP), at t-1 26.21 1.47 22.33 28.93
Agriculture added 
value Agriculture value added as share of GDP, at t-1 3.08 1.90 0.36 10.51
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TABLE 2. Determinants of Expenditure on Distributive Measures, EU countries 1992-2009
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Preelection -0.0156 1.507 -0.176 1.220 1.371 2.210
(3.177) (3.083) (3.164) (3.021) (2.757) (2.825)
Government preference -0.240 1.199 -0.0749 1.175 0.587 1.223
(0.952) (0.744) (0.945) (0.757) (0.930) (0.759)
District magnitude -0.295*** -0.325** -0.329 -1.710 -0.658 -1.054
(0.0799) (0.163) (0.566) (2.930) (0.522) (2.986)
Personal vote -22.11** -50.44*** -19.18* -50.75***
(10.85) (15.77) (11.44) (15.56)
District magnitude × 0.0314 -0.342 0.697 -0.245
Personal vote (0.883) (0.423) (0.775) (0.461)
Ballot control 1.713 -34.31 10.24 -32.47
(12.71) (27.40) (12.80) (27.56)
District magnitude × -0.212 0.997 0.184 0.399
Ballot control (0.612) (2.990) (0.559) (3.038)
Government range -1.375 -0.178 -1.609* -0.296 -0.0132 0.0260
(0.946) (0.814) (0.933) (0.835) (2.351) (2.272)
Contract 32.94 22.67
(24.98) (23.36)




Government range × 4.215 3.246
Delegation (4.879) (4.139)
GDP per capita t-1 -0.000310 0.000394* -0.000188 0.000380* 0.000334 0.000436*
(0.0003) (0.000224) (0.000295) (0.000228) (0.000224) (0.000223)
GDP growth rate t-1 -0.901 0.291 -0.825 0.255 0.306 0.675
(0.976) (0.598) (0.951) (0.582) (0.623) (0.540)
Trade openness t-1 0.0580 -0.215 0.0468 -0.201 -0.178** -0.235
(0.115) (0.151) (0.122) (0.152) (0.0762) (0.182)
Eurozone -14.15 -41.19*** -17.14 -41.03*** -14.86 -39.93***
(12.01) (12.89) (12.14) (12.86) (9.681) (11.75)
Regulation 2.155 18.70* 4.055 18.92* -1.588 18.91*
(10.23) (11.26) (10.53) (11.32) (8.846) (10.27)
Constant 78.85*** 44.20*** 93.58*** 84.12*** 80.34*** 87.85***
(15.66) (13.40) (16.46) (20.76) (19.31) (23.88)
District magnitude | -0.535** -0.780*** -0.336 -0.704***
Ballot control † (0.257) (0.240) (0.229) (0.235)
District magnitude | -0.300 -2.026 -0.015 -1.281
No ballot control † (0.266) (2.839) (0.207) (2.910)
Country fixed effects no yes no yes no yes
Observations 320 320 320 320 315 315
R-squared 0.154 0.579 0.171 0.582 0.184 0.463
Number of  groups 26 26 26 26 25 25
Wald chi2 32.89 62378 74.80 9199 93.99 28746
Rho 0.623 0.374 0.621 0.378 0.625 0.350
Prais-Winsten  regressions  with  panel  corrected  standard  errors.  Pairwise  selection  and  common  AR1  error  correction. 
Dependent variable: State aid expenditure. Coefficients and standard errors, in parentheses, multiplied by 100. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. † The other variables are set at their means.
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TABLE 2. Determinants of Expenditure on Distributive Measures, EU countries 1992-2009 - continued
 (7) (8) (9) (10)
Preelection 2.615 6.381 -2.747 -5.303
(4.395) (4.646) (3.754) (3.787)
Government preference 0.939 1.298 -0.0570 0.0469
(1.397) (1.015) (1.210) (0.986)
District magnitude -0.252 -56.99 0.446 37.49***
(0.693) (94.96) (0.972) (10.50)
Personal vote -3.735 948.9 3.464 293.7***
(13.80) (3,228) (18.50) (88.74)
District magnitude × 0.338 40.31 -0.938 -59.35***
Personal vote (0.947) (135.2) (1.399) (14.59)
Ballot control 36.67** 121.8 32.87 174.8***
(15.82) (1,285) (26.04) (64.54)
District magnitude × -0.397 97.69 -0.814 -38.00***
Ballot control (0.721) (169.9) (1.005) (10.47)
Government range -5.559 -5.598 10.72 9.831**
(7.375) (5.497) (6.873) (4.505)
Contract 82.16*** 107.1*** 77.38 10.02
(30.28) (30.63) (69.61) (37.14)
Government range × -24.01** -33.75*** -8.465 -3.543
Contract (10.08) (10.29) (7.078) (4.212)
Delegation -98.68** -75.70** 51.30 20.27
(40.24) (32.81) (81.26) (69.41)
Government range × 38.76*** 44.67*** -8.492 -9.079
Delegation (13.36) (11.85) (8.069) (7.645)
GDP per capita 7.09e-05 0.000406 0.000489 0.000345
(0.000363) (0.000403) (0.000346) (0.000210)
GDP growth rate -0.995 0.505 0.513 0.513
(0.830) (0.800) (0.696) (0.598)
Trade openness -0.0440 -0.407 -0.256*** 0.156
(0.120) (0.260) (0.0781) (0.218)
Eurozone -25.13* -57.67*** -22.81 -48.36*
(13.45) (12.71) (16.99) (25.23)
Regulation -4.589 8.751 11.12 41.92*
(10.51) (10.38) (15.49) (23.88)
Constant 63.03** -476.5 -20.53 -210.1***
(26.77) (2,155) (73.09) (79.63)
District magnitude | -0.593** 47.43 -0.60 -15.03***
Ballot control † (0.254) (99.53) (0.43) (3.52)
District magnitude | 0.090 -16.19 -0.33 -11.90***
No ballot control † (0.433) (53.04) (0.21) (3.89)
Country fixed effects No yes no yes
Subsets Delegation states Delegation states Contract states Contract states
Observations 164 164 151 151
R-squared 0.257 0.614 0.329 0.649
Number of  groups 20 20 20 20
Wald chi2 54.79 951.5 1940 1042
Rho 0.568 0.243 0.609 0.129
Prais-Winsten regressions with panel corrected standard errors. Pairwise selection and common AR1 error correction.  
Dependent variable:  State aid expenditure. Coefficients and standard errors,  in parentheses, multiplied by 100. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. † The other variables are set at their means.
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TABLE 3: Determinants of State Aid Applications in the EU, 1999-2009
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Preelection 1.596 1.940 1.468 1.982 1.839 2.311
(10.41) (8.834) (10.35) (8.804) (10.51) (8.938)
District magnitude 0.0864 -0.0414 0.334** 7.749 0.335 14.13***
(0.159) (0.141) (0.141) (6.143) (1.086) (5.427)
Ballot control 26.73** 82.45 29.90* 143.8**
(12.20) (64.17) (15.70) (67.50)
District magnitude × -1.016*** -8.146 -1.009 -14.35**
Ballot control (0.314) (6.424) (1.065) (5.724)
Personal vote 4.446 71.27
(10.96) (65.63)
District magnitude × 0.0165 -6.113***
Personal vote (1.502) (1.723)
GDP t-1 53.93*** -64.30** 54.63*** -67.01*** 54.37*** -63.46**
(3.305) (25.28) (3.168) (25.38) (4.523) (26.13)
Agriculture added value t-1 4.914* -3.640 5.460* -5.315 5.524** -3.558
(2.670) (13.18) (3.080) (13.35) (2.794) (14.31)
Constant -1.207*** 1.947*** -1.232*** 1.990*** -1.230*** 1.836**
(85.71) (683.6) (82.83) (689.9) (112.9) (734.3)
District magnitude | -0.683** -0.397 -0.671* -1.357*
Ballot control † (0.283) (0.366) (0.351) (0.700)
District magnitude | 0.334** 7.749 0.350 8.599*
No ballot control † (0.141) (6.143) (0.309) (4.687)
Country fixed effects no yes no yes no yes
Observations 219 219 219 219 219 219
R-squared 0.559 0.781 0.576 0.782 0.576 0.784
Number of  groups 25 25 25 25 25 25
Wald chi2 272.3 114.9 302.3 289.0 395.6 389.5
OLS regressions with panel  corrected  standard errors.  Unbalanced  panel.  Dependent  variable:  State aid  
applications. Coefficients and standard errors, in parentheses, multiplied by 100. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *  
p<0.1. † The other variables are set at their means.
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FIGURE 1. Expenditure and electoral institutions
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FIGURE 2. Expenditure and fiscal institutions
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FIGURE 3. Fragmentation and electoral institutions
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